The relationship between citizen and State is not one-sided. On one hand, individuals are shaped by the social and political systems that they live in. Our society plays a large part in our desires, fears, and conception of ourselves. On the other, political systems seek to govern individuals. Therefore, in seeking to justify a political system, a political philosophy must rely on a conception of human nature.

The political system of the United States is liberal democracy. In fact, the United States was the first nation founded with an explicitly liberal government. Liberalism is a political philosophy that places individual rights and freedom above all else. Since the end of World War II, liberalism has been the dominant political philosophy of Western nations. Recently, however, liberalism in the United States and across the globe has been failing. We are experiencing widespread discontent with public institutions and the rise of populism and authoritarianism. In this context, liberalism can be questioned and criticized from many directions. However, given that much of the backlash to liberalism is driven by citizens who feel unseen and disrespected, I believe that it is especially important to ask: Does liberalism understand people? Is liberalism based on a robust, realistic conception of human nature? And if not, can it justify itself while accommodating such a conception?

One way to approach these questions is empirically, by studying modern liberal democracies. However, if we are interested in the viability of liberalism itself, instead of a particular nation's system of government, these questions should be explored through philosophy. The liberal-communitarian debate, which emerged in the 1980s, sheds light on liberalism's conception of human nature. In 1971, John Rawls published A Theory of Justice, which argues for a particular flavor of liberalism. A Theory of Justice "was said to revive political philosophy when it was published",¹ and while the book was a bold departure from the views preceding it, today its ideas have become deeply held. Rawls is held up as the "torchbearer" of modern liberalism.² In 1982, Michael Sandel published Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, which criticizes liberalism on the grounds that it offers an inadequate and wrong conception of human nature. Diving into Rawls' work and Sandel's rebuttal will give us a greater understanding of liberalism's appeal and its relationship with human nature and the identities of the individuals that it seeks to govern.

Rawls

"Justice is the first virtue of social institutions," is how Rawls begins A Theory of Justice.³ Justice is more than just another value to Rawls. It is the yardstick on which other values are measured, the "value of values".⁴ While utilitarianism-the dominant ethical system at the time of Rawls' writing-sees justice as instrumentally important to ensure happiness and well-being, Rawls sees justice as an end in itself. As a result, ensuring a just society is more important than any other concerns. Rawls writes: "Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override".⁵ The reasons that Rawls believes in the primacy of justice are complex, but two components are 1) he sees justice as universal and 2) he asserts that all people share a core idea of justice, namely, forbidding arbitrary distinctions between persons.⁶

What is justice to Rawls? First, he restricts his theory of justice to social justice. The justice that Rawls discusses has as its subject the basic structure of society, which is the way that major social institutions-not just the government-distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages that come from social cooperation.⁷ Rawls sees society as characterized by cooperation and conflict. Justice is necessary because people in a society cooperate to their mutual benefit but are also inherently in a state of conflict over their share of those benefits. This is one of what he calls the circumstances of justice.⁸

After asserting the primacy of justice and describing its role (distributing rights and benefits), Rawls moves to describing a just society. To determine the principles that govern a just society, Rawls employs the original position, an ingenious thought experiment that has become an inseparable part of his philosophy.

The original position imagines a group of people deciding together on the principles that will govern their society. The participants have equal power in the negotiation, and they are assumed to be rational and mutually disinterested (primarily focused on their own ends). What is more significant, however, is what the participants do not have. They do not know their own social status or class position, or the distribution of their natural assets, such as intelligence, strength, or work ethic. No one even knows their own preferences, interests, or conception of the good. To make a decision possible, the participants get a general understanding of government, the economy, and human psychology, but any facts that would allow participants to distinguish themselves from others are hidden by what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance.⁹

Why is so much forbidden from our hypothetical decision makers? Rawls writes, "Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage".¹⁰ Rawls believes that the veil of ignorance ensures fairness. Without it, people will push for principles that favor their particular condition. A wealthy man, for example, would advocate against wealth redistribution-not because he thinks it is just, but to benefit himself.

Rawls asserts that the principles agreed to in the original position-which he calls the principles of justice-are the correct principles for a just society. Since the original position is fair, the agreements made in the position will be fair too. Thus, when social institutions satisfy the principles of justice, people can say that they are "cooperating on terms to which they would agree"¹¹ if their relations with each other were fair. This is the beauty of the original position. In this way, "a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme".¹² This provides political legitimacy: In a society governed by the principles agreed to in the original position, everyone can be rightfully obligated to abide by the law. Here, Rawls' thought aligns with social contract theory, such as John Locke's Second Treatise of Government. However, where Locke's initial situation is a "state of nature", Rawls' is the original position.

After Rawls establishes that the principles of justice are the ones agreed to in the original position, he moves to a second question: What principles would in fact be adopted by the equal, free, and veiled participants?

The participants are rational and focused on their own well-being. They would understand that they only have one life and must abide by the principles even in the worst possibilities, so they would "insure themselves against the worst eventualities".¹³ Therefore, Rawls reasons, the participants would reject the principle of utility, which requires an individual to sacrifice his well-being when it benefits others more than it hurts him. Instead, the participants would agree to two principles. First (and foremost), "each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others." Second, "social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all".¹⁴

The second principle, called the Difference Principle, is more controversial than the first. It entails that any social or economic inequality is acceptable only if it benefits the least advantaged member of society. For example, a businessman could only make more money than others-in fact the position of a businessman could only exist-if the poorest person was benefited by the businessman having more money and power. The Difference Principle has radical implications, but through the lens of the original position, it makes sense. Every participant has to consider the possibility that they will be the least advantaged member of society (no one knows that they are not). No participant would agree to others having more than them, unless they know that they will benefit from it.

Kant

In Liberalism and The Limits of Justice, Sandel's criticism begins by framing Rawls' relationship to Kant. Much of Rawls' philosophy stems from Kant: Rawls writes, "the theory of justice in turn tries to present a natural procedural rendering of Kant's conception of the kingdom of ends, and of the notions of autonomy and the categorical imperative".¹⁵

Kant believed that we know nothing from our passively received representations. Our experience is created by our innate mental rules for combining representations, which exist independently and prior to those representations.¹⁶ He believed that our self-consciousness, the awareness that the different mental states that stream through our consciousness are experienced by one unified person, is an a priori judgement, which means that it is known independent of experience.^17,18 Therefore, the thinking subject is unable to be reached empirically, by introspection, and must be presupposed. To Kant, the agent is prior to any experience.

Additionally, Kant differentiated two worlds: the phenomenal and the noumenal. The phenomenal world is the world as it appears to us. It consists of the appearances of things. The noumenal world, on the other hand, consists of things in themselves. However, it exists independently of our experience and is imperceptible to us.¹⁹ Kant believes that we are rational agents, characterized by autonomy and absolute moral worth. Crucially, this autonomy exists in the noumenal realm. Physically and phenomenally, we are determined, but we must conceive of ourselves as being free. We are transcendentally or noumenally free.²⁰

This metaphysical picture informs Kant's political philosophy. His political ideal is the kingdom of ends. The kingdom of ends exists in the noumenal realm. In it, rational beings abide by moral law, regarding each other as having equal dignity and treating each other as ends instead of means.²¹ A rational being must "act as if he were by his maxims in every case a legislating member in the universal kingdom of ends".²²

In this way, Kant argues, we are committed to a liberal social order that values freedom and equality.²³ This obligation is not rooted in empirical considerations such as happiness or well-being. Rather, we must obey moral law because it is in our nature as rational beings.²⁴

Sandel

Rawls shares many of Kant's conclusions. Both believe in the priority of the right over the good and deontology, the view that principles of justice should not presuppose any ends or determinate conception of the good. However, Kant's moral philosophy relies on his metaphysics and the idea that we are disembodied rational agents in the noumenal realm. This is unacceptable for Rawls and most other political philosophers. Rawls seeks to reach universal, Kantian principles of justice that apply to human beings in our actual, empirical circumstances. According to Sandel, "Rawls rejects Kant's metaphysics, but believes he can preserve their moral force".²⁵

Rawls faces a tricky challenge: If his principles are derived from current social values, they will be contingent, not universal. However, if they are entirely divorced from current values and human nature, they will be groundless. Sandel describes Rawls as bringing together the contradicting Humean and Kantian conceptions of justice. Hume believed that justice is the product of human conventions, and therefore not universal. Rawls also believes that justice is the product of human convention, specifically the fact that societies are in conflict over the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, but he wants to advance universal principles of justice. His tool to bridge this gap is the original position.²⁶

Rawls writes, "the description of the original position interprets the point of view of noumenal selves".²⁷ Like the participants in the original position, the noumenal self is rational and fair, being stripped from contingent and therefore morally irrelevant social and natural influences. However, the original position does not have to "rely on a noumenal realm or on the notion of a transcendent subject wholly beyond experience".²⁸ Instead, the circumstances of justice are baked into the original position: the participants are mutually disinterested, want to maximize their own benefits, and are in conflict over the distribution of benefits.

A key contention in Sandel's criticism of Rawls is that Rawls' argument necessarily posits an account of the individual subject of justice. "Implicit in Rawls' theory of justice is a conception of the moral subject," Sandel claims.²⁹ This makes sense. A political philosophy must rely on a conception of human nature. However, Sandel also claims that Rawls' conception of the moral subject is reflected in the participants of the original position. This is not so clear. Rawls clearly states that, "we must keep in mind that the parties to the original position are theoretically defined individuals" and that "the motivation of the persons in the original position must not be confused with the motivation of persons in everyday life who accept the principles that would be chosen".³⁰

Why does Sandel claim that it is appropriate to level a criticism at Rawls through the subjects in the original position? His answer points to the unique status of the original position as an argument. Rawls describes the original position as a "reflective equilibrium".³¹ It puts forth claims about both principles of justice and human nature. Therefore, it must be evaluated from two sides: 1) our intuitions about the correct principles of justice and 2) our intuitions about the moral subject. While the people in the original position need not be exactly like us, they must have some connection to us. Otherwise, why would the decision of imaginary people in a hypothetical situation be relevant to us? Their decision is binding to us because they are meant to have all human qualities that are necessary for making moral decisions. The conditions of the original position come from "the nature of the moral subject as we understand it, which is to say by the constitutive understanding we have of ourselves".³² Therefore, Sandel contends, "we must be prepared to live with the vision contained in the original position".³³

What, then, is the vision of human nature contained in the original position? Based on the original position, we must be somewhat rational and mutually disinterested, although Rawls does not believe that humans are perfectly rational or individualistic. Crucially, the individuals in the original position are separated from their ends. They do not know what they believe or desire.

For Rawls, this is possible because "the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by it".³⁴ Rawls conceives the relationship between the self and its ends as one of possession, where the self is "distanced from its ends without being detached all together".³⁵ The self being prior to the ends is seen in Rawls' moral view that conceptions of the good are not relevant to justice. It is also seen, Sandel alleges, in his metaphysical view that the self exists independently from its ends.

After arguing that A Theory of Justice entails a particular account of human nature, Sandel attacks this account. Rawls claims that the conditions of the original position track with our commonly shared intuitions about the moral subject. Sandel disagrees, writing that "Rawls' conception of the person can neither support his theory of justice nor plausibly account for our capacities for agency and self-reflection." "We cannot coherently regard ourselves as the sort of beings the deontological ethic requires us to be".³⁶

Sandel attacks Rawls' conception of the self by arguing that the Rawlsian self cannot form constitutive attachments. The Rawlsian self is "antecedently individuated." Its identity is "fixed prior to experience".³⁷ This subject is not constituted by his character traits, interpersonal relationships, and desires; he possesses these things. Possession means, Sandel writes, that "If I lose a thing I possess, I am still the same 'I' who had it".³⁸ The Difference Principle acutely exposes this feature of Rawls' philosophy. Rawls believes that the benefits that one earns from their own natural assets, such as intelligence, courage, and work ethic, belong to society. This appears as if it conflicts with Kant's imperative by using people as means rather than ends. To Rawls, however, stripping a person from the fruits of their assets does not use them as a means because a person's natural assets are not an integral part of their self.

The Rawlsian subject always stands at a distance from his interests and exists independently from his values. Therefore, no commitment could grip him so deeply that he couldn't exist as himself without it.³⁹ According to Sandel, the Rawlsian conception of the self "rules out the possibility of any attachment (or obsession) able to reach beyond our values and sentiments to engage our identity itself".⁴⁰ The Rawlsian self, Sandel claims, is "a person wholly without character, without moral depth".⁴¹ Human beings are capable of self-reflection, in which we investigate who we really are by probing at our inner desires and formative relationships. This requires that our inner self be "constituted in part by our central aspirations and attachments".⁴²

As a communitarian, Sandel gives special attention to community, one of the many attachments that, in Rawls' view, cannot be constitutive towards our identity. Sandel believes that our community, which provides us with shared vocabulary, practices, and values, shapes our identity. We have allegiances "as members of this family, community, nation," he writes. "We are sons or daughters of that revolution and citizens of that republic".⁴³ Liberal justice assumes that individuals are unfamiliar. Since we are "encumbered in part by a history"^{44 that we share with others, Sandel asserts, we have an obligation towards some people that goes beyond what justice requires or even permits.45}

Sandel has painted Rawls' subject as abstract, disencumbered, and unrealistic: the Kantian moral self that Rawls set out to avoid. The participants of the original position cannot be thought of as resembling people at all. Since they are deprived of all distinguishing characteristics, they are identical.⁴⁶ The supposed plurality of individuals melts into an indistinguishable monolith. This is in stark contrast with liberalism's purported tolerance of diversity, an essential part of its appeal. Moreover, the participants in the original position do not in fact decide on the principles of justice. Making an informed decision requires reflecting on our values and character traits. Instead, the participants of the original position determine the principles of justice that are imposed by the conditions of the thought experiment.⁴⁷ Rawls' principles of justice are not based on the consent of multiple parties, which is required for a contract or agreement.⁴⁸ Therefore, his argument does not fit into the contractarian tradition. According to Sandel, Rawls' lacking conception of the self leaves his theory of justice unjustified.

Conclusion

Sandel's criticism of A Theory of Justice is from a communitarian perspective, although he disavows that label. He argues that in assuming that the self is antecedently individuated, Rawls, who claims to rule out no conceptions of the good, rules out communitarian ones. Liberalism is too individualistic. While community can be an aim of some of the subjects of a liberal society, the society itself can never be a community. In fact, Rawls rules out any ends whose adoption could engage with or transform the identity of the self.⁴⁹

However, the complaint that liberalism relies on an unrealistic conception of the self is not an exclusively communitarian concern. Libertarian Robert Nozick, rebutting Rawls' Difference Principle in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, writes that Rawls, "presses very hard on the distinction between men and their talents, assets, abilities and special traits".⁵⁰ He agrees with Sandel: Rawls' subject, detached from its abilities and character traits, resembles the Kantian disencumbered self.⁵¹

Additionally, liberalism is not the only political philosophy that has been criticized for not understanding people. Rawls himself criticized utilitarianism on similar grounds, writing that "utilitarianism extends to society the principle of choice for one man." "To do this is not to take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals".⁵² This argument is taken up by Bernard Williams in A Critique of Utilitarianism. Williams asserts that utilitarianism "can make only the most superficial sense of human desire and action at all."⁵³ As a type of consequentialism, utilitarianism endorses negative responsibility. You are just as responsible for killing someone as you are for failing to prevent a murder.⁵⁴ Classically, utilitarianism also ignores equity. In its unyielding focus on maximizing happiness across all agents, only the total happiness matters, not its distribution-even if some agents are left with none.⁵⁵ Both of these points show that utilitarianism abstracts from the identity of individual moral agents.

The liberal-communitarian debate and the criticism of utilitarianism show that the identity of its citizens is something that a political system needs to consider. As political philosophers build empires in the sky, they must not forget to ground them in human nature. Our identities are constituted by-and inconceivable independent of-our values, community, and character traits. The State needs to speak to, attempt to provide, or engage with our deep-seated allegiances and conceptions of the good, not ignore them. Rawlsian liberalism, in taking people to be detached from their identities, is flawed.

It is important to note that A Theory of Justice is not the end of Rawls' political thought and Rawls' liberalism is not the only form of liberalism. Nevertheless, even though the United States is not the well-ordered society that Rawls envisioned, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice resonates intensely today. Liberalism, Sandel asserts, "rules out the possibility of a public life in which, for good or ill, the identity as well as the interests of the participants could be at stake".⁵⁶ It "overlooks the danger that when politics goes badly, not only disappointments but dislocations are likely to result".⁵⁷ In the Trump era of American politics, it is clear that identity is at stake. Liberalism has attempted to put the self beyond that reach of politics, but this is not possible. In his conclusion, Sandel writes that the citizens of the deontological republic are "strangers"⁵⁸ and that the Rawlsian self "is less liberated than disempowered".⁵⁹ Today, despite unprecedented, world-wide communication, we are strangers to our neighbors. Despite unprecedented freedom, we feel less liberated than disempowered. Liberalism has broken its promises, and its flawed understanding of human nature is a compelling explanation for why.

¹ Paul Weithman, "Introduction." in Rawls's A Theory of Justice at 50, ed. Paul Weithman (Cambridge University Press, 2023), 1.

² Catherine G. Campbell, Persons, Identity, and Political Theory: A Defense of Rawlsian Political Identity (Springer, 2014), 22.

³ John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Harvard University Press, 1999), 3.

⁴ Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 16.

⁵ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 3.

⁶ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 5.

⁷ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 6.

⁸ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 109.

⁹ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 16-17.

¹⁰ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 118.

¹¹ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 12.

¹² Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 12.

¹³ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 154.

¹⁴ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 53.

¹⁵ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 233.

¹⁶ Terry Pinkard, German Philosophy 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 26-27.

¹⁷ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 31.

¹⁸ Self-consciousness here refers to objective unity of consciousness as opposed to subjective unity of consciousness. See https://www.philosopher.eu/texts/kant-on-self-consciousness/.

¹⁹ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 41.

²⁰ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 46-47.

²¹ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 54.

²² Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. T. K. Abbott (1785; Project Gutenberg, May 1, 2004), Sec. 2, https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/5682.

²³ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 55-56.

²⁴ Pinkard, German Philosophy, 59-60.

²⁵ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 24.

²⁶ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 35-39.

²⁷ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 225.

²⁸ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 39.

²⁹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 49.

³⁰ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 127-128.

³¹ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 18.

³² Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 48.

³³ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 48.

³⁴ Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 491.

³⁵ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 55.

³⁶ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 65.

³⁷ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 55.

³⁸ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 55.

³⁹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 62.

⁴⁰ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 62.

⁴¹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 179.

⁴² Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 172.

⁴³ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 179.

⁴⁴ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 181.

⁴⁵ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 179.

⁴⁶ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 131.

⁴⁷ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 127-130.

⁴⁸ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 132.

⁴⁹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 61-64.

⁵⁰ Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 228.

⁵¹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 79.

⁵² Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 26

⁵³ J. J. C. Smart and Bernard Williams, "A Critique of Utilitarianism." in Utilitarianism: For and Against, (Cambridge University Press, 1973), 82.

⁵⁴ Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, 93-95.

⁵⁵ Smart and Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, 142-143.

⁵⁶ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 62

⁵⁷ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 183.

⁵⁸ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 183.

⁵⁹ Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 177.