Searching the Self: A Successfully Failed Attempt

Self as a concept is everywhere in day-to-day life. "I" think that this shirt looks good; "his" heart is broken; "my" childhood was happy, so on. When we use "self" as a folk concept, it seems to be a substantial entity with agency (I can perform action), ownership (I can have things, material or not), and diachronicity (I last in time). However, if the self is such an entity, then where is it? Or if not, what is it?

Instead of discussing it from a purely conceptual or scientific point of view, I've chosen to approach this question with an experiential perspective. We will talk about the experiences of "self-dissolution" in two cases: meditation and depersonalization. But before we begin, let me briefly overview some of the conceptual and scientific research and findings on the self, so we might better integrate or challenge them based on experiences.

From a metaphysical perspective, self can possibly be viewed as (1) a substance (realism), (2) a combination of various distinct and changing mental states (bundle theory), (3) a constructed fictional entity (narrative self theory), or (4) nothing at all, an illusion (no-self theory). There are many variations within each category but let's just start from here. It's worth noting that the ontology of self (whether self exists) is not the same as the sense of self (the experience of self). Even if people claim to experience being a single subject in everyday life, this does not guarantee that the self is indeed a single subject, or vice versa.

Realism/Substantialism: In the tradition of Western philosophy, self is often assumed to be an entity. Many believe that self is the unconstructed starting point of all experiences and thoughts. They assume that self is an entity that bears properties such as consciousness, emotion, perceptions, and so on. Not only is the sense of self real, but the self itself is real. They will tend to take propositions with self as a subject or object literally. For example, when we talk about "I am sad", the "I" is a real entity experiencing sadness.

Bundle Theory: However, such a view faces the attack of bundle theorists such as Hume, who claims that self is only constructed by a bundle of perceptions and cognitions. They think there is not a self sustaining synchronically and diachronically. The self is only a metaphorical union of all these perceptions.

The Narrative Self Theory: Some researchers suggest that we should neither take self as an entity, nor say that self is a mere illusion. Rather, we can take "self" as a useful fiction. With such fiction, we are able to form a narrative of our life. I take the person who opened the laptop two minutes ago and the person who will finish writing this paper as myself. Even if there isn't necessarily an ontological entity of myself who endures all these events, I still make sense of my narration with a fictional self. This narrative self bears those core values and commitments that allow one to make long term plans and decisions; thus, even if there is no substance of the "self," I can still form a personal identity.

No-Self Theory: This theory emerges from various traditions of Eastern philosophy. Buddhism suggests that the sense of self is a mere illusion. Other schools of thought, such as Daoism, also point out that a no-self experience is not only possible, but even desirable. The no-self theory suggests that there is no ontological entity of self, and the illusion of its existence should be deconstructed in order to achieve a better life.

Please note that all the above-mentioned non-realism views might sometimes all be put under the label of no-self theory. However, I want to differentiate the no-self or self-illusionism theories from theories which claim that the self is constructed by other factors or narrations; such theories might not necessarily agree that self is a mere illusion. They could still hold that the self is a composite object.

Now, let's turn to the empirical basis of self; that is, how does the self manifest itself in the physical world? Through what kind of biological process does self come into existence, whether it is a substance, a composite, or an illusion? How can empirical findings support or oppose these theories?

Altered State of Consciousness and the Altered Self

Altered state of consciousness broadly refers to the conscious states that are qualitatively different from normal waking states. There are many types of altered states of consciousness but in this article, we will focus on two cases with significant alterations of the sense of self in this article: meditation and depersonalization. In this section, we will see how these states are experienced and how people describe the sense of self or selflessness in them.

Most Buddhist traditions are against self-realism, though different traditions do have differing views of the self. Interestingly, they not only provide metaphysical theories but also experiential understanding through consistently practicing meditation. Buddhists believe that understanding the theoretical basis is not enough; it is having an immediate experience of selflessness that will lead to true knowledge and freedom, called "nirvana" (for a first-person discussion on this topic, see Pagett Tollen's, "Speak, Buddha," in this issue). The Buddhist theory of self as an illusion or an unstable series of changes can be revealed in meditation. So, what does such an experience feel like?

In 2019, Lindahl & Britton reviewed and discussed the Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anattā) and their findings on the experience of self in The Varieties of Contemplative Experience (VCE) research project.¹ They found that loss and changes of the sense of self are not as monotonous as we might think; instead, they identified six discrete categories, each of which comprises a certain aspect of self, listed from most complex to most fundamental: change in narrative self, loss of sense of ownership, loss of sense of agency, change in sense of embodiment, change in self-other or self-world boundaries, and loss of sense of basic self. There are many interesting cases from this project. Let us briefly go over some examples from the paper and discuss. Please note that they interviewed many meditators.

The most complex category is the narrative self. The narrative self is what holds our identities and autobiographical memory. This includes one's past, personal narratives, and future-oriented goals. Personality like "I am a positive person" or "I don't like ice cream," can also be part of it. Some meditators report losing their narrative self such that:

"I felt that my identity was threatened. I would walk, and I would feel that I forgot my past. At some point on the retreat, I literally forgot my name. I was like, 'Wait, what is my name again?' Yeah, I totally forgot. [...]"

Next most complex, the ownership of one's body and agency, can also be lost:

"Yeah, well I didn't have a sense of my body belonging to a 'me'. There wasn't a sense of 'me' there. I could feel my hand - there was a feeling of a hand, but it didn't feel like my hand."

And,

"I was on this automatic pilot of just being able to go to the bathroom and feed myself - because those things were on this sort of automatic pilot that I was able to keep doing them. But there wasn't a 'me' doing them."

Not only do they lose their temporally extended self and their bodily self, but also the way their experiences are located has changed; that is, embodiment. Some of them have experiences similar to the so-called "out-of-body experience":

"I had experiences of my body virtually disappearing or dropping through the ground or through the floor - feeling like I was suddenly dropping three or four feet."

And this goes beyond the boundaries of their bodies to the way they connect to the world:
"The boundary between me and my environment began to break down. A bird flew in front of me, but it didn't fly in front of me - it flew through me.

Finally, even the most fundamental, the viewpoint and continuity of consciousness, which some philosophers deem an unchangeable level of self, has been claimed to have changed. As one described:

"I didn't even know what an individual discrete consciousness was, or a person, but I lost contact with the essence, so it wasn't like a realization experience - it was just complete delusion."

It seems that in meditation, many multidimensional types of self-consciousness can be altered. This shows that the no-self experience in meditation is complex but also very complete in that it extends spatially, temporally, and on different levels.

Are there similarities between this and the loss of self which occurs from depersonalization? Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DPDR, DDD) is characterized by a detachment from reality and self, usually with some related alteration of the sense of time, bodily sensation, and so on. Let us focus on the self-related part of its symptoms.² Although the six categories identified in VCE were meant to distinguish the phenomenology of mediation, the detachment towards oneself also reflects on the above-mentioned categories, as shown in studies of pathological depersonalization cases.

The Cambridge Depersonalization Scale is a tool that is often used to test the frequency and duration of depersonalization and derealization symptoms.³ Surprisingly, many of the items mirror that of the VCE.

The alteration of the narrative self is evidenced by items such as, "I feel detached from memories of things that have happened to me-as if I had not been involved in them."

Body ownership and agency are also core symptoms of the disorder. Individuals with depersonalization often report that "parts of my body feel as if they didn't belong to me," or describe the "feeling of being a detached observer of oneself." Agency is frequently compromised as well: "When I move, it doesn't feel as if I were in charge of the movements; I feel 'automatic' and mechanical, as if I were a 'robot.'"

Disembodiment is another core feature of depersonalization disorder.⁴ The out-of-body experience often accompanies the detached observer perspective.

The altered self-world relationship in depersonalization lies mostly on its intersection with derealization. People experience that their "surroundings feel detached or unreal, as if there were a veil between me and the outside world." And finally, the fundamental self can be changed as many also lose the temporal continuity of experience and have it become fragmented instead.⁵

In conclusion, there are many parallels between the no-self experience in meditation and depersonalization. Both lead to multidimensional loss of the sense of self. However, meditation is often viewed as healthy and positive, whereas depersonalization is a tough clinical case. The following section explores what determines whether the loss of self is experienced as liberation or as a crisis.

Pathology vs. Path: The Valuation Gap

Instead of focusing on the detailed description of the no-self experiences, I want to show how their "aftermaths" can be highly different. Meditation has often been suggested as a way to practice mindfulness even outside of religious contexts. Many people claim that after practicing meditation, their life qualities improve, as does their physical and mental health. However, in dissociation, especially in those caused by traumatic events, the feeling of selflessness makes the subject feel helpless.⁵ There has always been a question if nirvana can be achieved without debilitating pathology. Lindahl & Britton (2019) hint that the more dimensions of selfhood attenuated by meditation, the more likely the experience will be distressing. However, if that is the case, nirvana does not seem like such a worthwhile goal anymore, as it is usually understood as a complete loss of self.

So what can be the possible explanation for the difference in these two types of no-self experiences? I think the key to understanding the importance of no-self is to move the focus from the phenomenology of no-self to the experiences of no-self. That is, to put this kind of experience under its proper context instead of singling it out. I will try to explore the possibility of a "contextual" version of the experiential realization of the self which highlights one's epistemic process and background.

To understand why the same realization-the non-existence of a permanent self-can be experienced so differently, consider a day-to-day analogy: the discovery that Santa Claus does not exist. Suppose that you have always believed in Santa and you learn that he doesn't exist. There are many ways to learn this: maybe you fought with your older siblings and they told you this to upset you, maybe you googled Santa and found out he is a fictional character, or maybe you started to doubt it and asked your teacher. You can imagine how the experience of learning this fact will be very different in each of these scenarios.

The fighting with siblings Santa scenario is the equivalent of experiencing no-self as the result of trauma, anxiety, or medically induced depersonalization. The self is stripped away without consent, leaving the individual feeling vulnerable and "robotic" rather than enlightened. This state emerges in people who have yet to develop a stable alternative to believing in the self, and have been forced to accept the truth too fast in a traumatic situation. Evidence can be found in how people with depersonalization are noticed to be drastically "overthinking" their conditions (hyperreflexivity). They will constantly try to figure out where their "selves" have gone to or whether the self really does not exist.⁶

Alternatively, imagine you have begun to notice inconsistencies in the existence of Santa (perhaps the handwriting on the gifts looks familiar) and you decide to research the history of the legend yourself. In this case, you are a willing participant in the discovery. You already have some mental preparation yourself. Asking a trusted teacher may help you process the truth about Santa without losing your sense of joy; in the same way, Buddhist philosophy provides a roadmap for the meditator. With someone (like a teacher or Buddhist philosophy) helping you digest the truth, it doesn't feel so unacceptable or shocking. Learning in this intentional way can make you feel like you have grown up and are not being fooled anymore.

My point is that in the current discussion, most people act as if meditation and depersonalization are separate mechanisms or are similar but different only on the level of severity. This kind of decontextualized view undermines the importance of the process of these experiences and the individual's knowledge of the self. When we talk about no-self, we should put the context back because the process by which we learn things directly affects how we react to them, especially when it comes to the self. Even Buddhism will not ask you to abandon the conventional self altogether-or they would have been like the Ancient Greek Skeptic figures, such as Pyrrho, who was said to be so skeptical of sensory reality that his friends had to pull him out of the way of carts and cliffs because he refused to acknowledge them as "real."

From "Self-Dissolution" to "Self-Disillusion"

Now, to return to the initial question of the ontology of self. What do the experiences tell us? Will the no-self experience really help us to find out the truth of self as merely an illusion, as Buddhist tradition has claimed? My current answer is still affirmative. The experiences (self-dissolution) of no-self do help one discover the truth of no-self (self-disillusion). However, it also matters if you are experiencing the dissolution too fast or if you are experiencing the dissolution along with the proper disillusion.

Experienced Buddhist meditators gradually become more and more clear about the nature of the self through their practice. But they not only have time to process it, they also have the theoretical tools of Buddhist philosophy. If they experience no-self, they can think that "well, maybe this does show that self is just a useful fiction after all!" or "I knew that self was constructed; see how these can all come apart!" This is exactly why in Buddhism, people not only need to meditate, but also read and discuss with their peers and mentors in order to reach freedom.

On the other hand, the tendency for depersonalized individuals to "overthink" is not just a personality trait; it is a desperate attempt by the brain to relocate the self. The individuals have to compensate with an exaggerated, metacognitive focus on their own internal states in order to remain functioning because they are suddenly forced to accept and, moreover, to live the truth of no-self. The difficulty of processing the unintuitive, bizarre experiences of no-self as created traumatic events is tremendous.

I believe we should pay equal attention to the experience of no-self and the context in which it occurs. Can these cases help us answer the ontological question of the self? Very likely. If a person can continue to live their life with zero experience of a "self," it suggests that the self is not a substantial entity but something that can be dissolved or even replaced. But that does not mean that how we get there doesn't matter, whether it be experientially (experiencing the self) or logically (reasoning about the self).

Final Remarks

The key reason why no-self experiences in meditation and depersonalization are received so differently lies in the context, that is, the process of finding out about the true nature of self. A useful next step in this study would be to see if providing good theoretical tools and suitable spaces for the patients and meditators experiencing uncomfortable no-self experiences helps with their situation. I will stop for now and leave you to drift away wherever you want to along with these thoughts I just gave you.