Karl Marx first engaged with philosophy as a "Young Hegelian", part of a group of left-wing thinkers who took themselves as successors to Hegel. Young Marx both defended Hegel's importance¹ and criticized his ideas. In 1843, he wrote Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, which criticized Hegel's political philosophy and methodology. Later, in 1873, he characterized his work as inverting Hegel's dialectic, which was "standing on its head," to "discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."²

The connection between Marx's and Hegel's ideas, however, is not at all straightforward. After his youth, Marx "abandoned speculative philosophy"³ and became more of a political economist and revolutionary than a philosopher. Furthermore, Hegel's views, at first glance, diverge wildly from Marx's. In Elements of the Philosophy of Right (1820), Hegel includes the market, which he calls civil society, in his conception of ethical life. Hegel's idea of civil society is one in which participants pursue their selfish ends, and he argues that this-à la Adam Smith's invisible hand-leads to the good of the whole.⁴ He also has a conservative bent, viewing the Prussian constitutional monarchy of his time positively and disparaging those prone to finding fault in existing institutions.

In this essay, I aim to explore the relationship between Marx and Hegel's projects and draw out threads of connection between them. I believe that this exploration is worthwhile because it both helps us understand an important influence on Marx and points toward the potential for the coexistence of Marx and Hegel's visions.

Marx

First, I will summarize Marx's analysis of capitalism. In Das Kapital, Marx begins his analysis with the commodity, which he writes is the "elementary form" of wealth in capitalism.⁵ Commodities are goods intended for exchange; in addition to a use-value, they have an exchange-value. Use-value is a natural property of things, while exchange-value is a social one. For example, the use-value of a hammer is to drive a nail into wood, while its exchange-value may be one loaf of bread, or two. In capitalist society, since exchange is frequent and widespread, exchanges are transitive and invertible. This means that if one hammer can be exchanged for two loaves of bread and two loaves of bread can be exchanged for one shirt, then one hammer can be exchanged for one shirt, and if one hammer can be exchanged for two loaves of bread, then two loaves of bread can be exchanged for one hammer. As a result, we say that these things have the same value. The general form of value-a commodity's value determined by all possible exchanges-coalesces by social custom with the money commodity (Marx was writing when money was commonly gold or silver rather than representational).⁶ Thus, we can say that the hammer, loaves, and shirt are worth $15.

Why does a particular commodity have a certain value? Marx believed that a product's value is constituted by the quantity of labor necessary to produce it: the labor theory of value. Specifically, value is constituted by "abstract labor", and concrete labor counts as abstract labor only when it is reduced to "socially necessary labor time" (the amount of labor necessary for production under average conditions) and is done for the satisfaction of monetary social demand.⁷ Crucially, this means that value is not a natural property of things but a social characteristic. A commodity's value is only tangible, visible, and measurable in exchange with another commodity. Objective value only exists within the exchange relationship; it is "spectral". Furthermore, abstract labor, which constitutes the value of commodities, is determined by the relation between individual labor and the total labor of society.⁸

This insight is very consequential for Marx. He sees members of capitalist society as deceived by commodity fetishism, which is the belief that commodities have an inherent exchange-value. "The commodity," Marx writes, "reflects the social characteristics of men's own labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things."⁹ In capitalism, social relationships between people in a market context appear as relationships between things. Thus, they appear to be objective, natural laws that humans must submit to. The products of men's hands take on a life of their own. This is fetishism: objects appear to take on mystical powers. However, it is not merely a false belief. Within capitalism, the quality of one's life is largely based on the value of his or her commodities. Because of commodity fetishism, people are ruled by things. Marx's insight here is that this does not have to be the case. The relations of domination in capitalist society which seem inherent, both capitalist over worker and value over humans, are actually the result of human behavior, specifically producing goods privately and exchanging them. Therefore, they can in principle be changed.¹⁰

Marx defines capital as "self-valorizing value." The general formula for capital is M-C-M', where money (M) is exchanged for commodities (C), which are exchanged for a greater sum of money (M'). This formula enables money to be an independent expression of value because it is not merely exchanged for a commodity but becomes the goal of the process. The movement of capital, M-C-M', is an end-in-itself and unlimited. Marx asserts that capital is the subject of capitalism. Capitalists seek unceasing profit not necessarily out of greed or their own free will but because they are driven to by capitalistic competition. The valorization of capital, not the interests of any individual, group, or society as a whole, is the aim of capitalism.¹¹

Marx is firm in his assertion that all surplus value generated in capitalism comes from labor-power. Labor-power, the ability of humans to perform labor, is the only commodity that has the use-value of generating value¹² (whether this has changed with generative AI is an interesting question). In capitalism, people who do not own means of production (workers or proletariat) are driven to sell their labor-power to those who do (capitalists or bourgeoisie). In exchange for labor-power, capitalists pay workers a wage: the value of the worker's labor-power. The value of labor-power is the amount needed for its reproduction, which means enough for the worker and his family's sustenance. The value of labor-power (wage) is lower than the value created by labor-power. This is the sole origin of surplus value. Marx defines this as exploitation: the worker receives only a portion of the newly produced value that he creates. Marx calls the amount of labor needed to generate one's wages "paid labor" and the remaining part of the workday "unpaid labor". Exploitation for Marx follows directly from commodity exchange: the worker receives the exchange-value of his labor-power, without regard for its use-value.¹³

As a result, Marx believes that capitalism is inherently exploitative. This does not refer to bad working conditions or low wages but the fact that the worker does not get a share of the surplus value that he creates. Nevertheless, it is also true that capitalism, which has the sole aim of valorizing capital, sees both nature and labor-power as mere instruments. A longer workday, higher intensity of work, and less investment in workplace health and safety, to the extent that they increase profit, will logically be pushed for by the capitalist. Furthermore, the productivity of labor tends to increase with the standardization and division of labor and adoption of machines and technology. Of the methods for increasing productivity in the capitalist system, Marx writes: "They distort the worker into a fragment of a man, they degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, they destroy the actual content of his labor by turning it into torment; they alienate from him the intellectual potentialities of the labor process..."¹⁴

Marx concludes Das Kapital by further arguing that social relations in capitalism are mystified. He attacks the "trinity formula", which asserts that capital, land, and labor-power all contribute value in the process of production. This misconception is rooted in a misconception about wages, held by capitalists and workers alike. It appears as if wages represent the value of labor, but really, they represent the value of labor-power. If a worker is paid $100 for a day of work, it appears as if his labor is worth $100 and that the unpaid labor Marx has defined doesn't exist. This allows for the fetishism of capital, which is the belief that capital is the cause of profit, rather than living labor. In Marx's view, this hides the fact that labor creates value, while capital is a source of income only because it allows the capitalist to extract surplus labor from workers, and land is a source of income only because the landowner negotiates for a share of the surplus value appropriated on his land. By endowing capital (and land) with magical, value-creating abilities, fetishism in capitalism causes the factors of production and thus capitalist production to be naturalized, reified, and take on an objective necessity in the consciousnesses of both capitalists and workers.¹⁵

Relationship with Hegel

Equipped with a basic understanding of Marx, we can now examine his relationship with Hegel. There have been wide-ranging perspectives on this relationship. In Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction' (1985), W. A. Suchting contends that "Marx's account is clad in Hegelian-dialectical garb,"¹⁶ but Marx's flirtations with Hegel were "not so much with Hegel's thought as with his terminology."¹⁷ He writes straightforwardly, "My claim is only that the materialist tendency is the dominant one and that which is innovative and valuable, the Hegelian being a recessive and sterile survival."¹⁸

In his essay From Marx to Hegel (1968), socialist writer George Lichtheim rejects the idea that Hegel's dialectical method is the connection between Hegel and Marxist thought. Instead, he claims, "The fact is that Hegel has continued to matter for a wholly different reason: namely because his philosophy impinged upon the central theme of political thought-the relation of theory to practice."¹⁹ Lichtheim reads Kant as restricting theory to the phenomenal realm and leaving morality to the noumenal realm, along with freedom, where it cannot be grounded theoretically. Hegel, on the other hand, takes the view that theoretical insight into things-in-themselves is possible, allowing him to theorize about political practice and ground this theory in his understanding of history. According to Lichtheim, this empowered the Young Hegelians, such as Marx, to conclude that practical action (revolution) was theoretically necessary given an understanding of history (for Marx, this was his materialist understanding).²⁰

In Karl Marx and the Actualization of Philosophy (2025), Christoph Schuringa describes Marx as a radical critic of Hegel who attacked not only his political philosophy and idealism but his philosophical approach and dialectic. Schuringa's central claim is that Marx did not, as I wrote above, abandon philosophy. He instead sought to actualize philosophy (philosophy is taken to be "thinking without limit"²¹) by making it a practical force in the real world. This is opposed to Hegel, who understood philosophy as granting "reconciliation with actuality"-reflecting on reality, not changing it.²² Yet, it is also Hegelian, as Hegel's philosophy aims for the unity of concept with actuality.

Dialectic

The first place to look in Hegel's philosophy is certainly the Hegelian dialectic. The dialectic is a process or movement that can be outlined as such: Hegel begins with a truth, and from it, comes to an internal contradiction. From this contradiction, a new truth is necessitated. The new truth sublates (supersedes, negates, and preserves) the old one. The new truth is a "determinate negation" of the old truth; since it contains the negation of the old truth in it, it has content instead of being empty. The dialectic is Hegel's methodology. For example, he uses it in the Phenomenology of Spirit to investigate different theories of knowledge and present his own. The dialectical method iteratively progresses closer to the truth. It reasons using contradictions, building off them and incorporating them into its understanding instead of flatly rejecting them.

However, the dialectic is not merely a tool of investigation or form of argumentation. In Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), Hegel states, "Wherever there is movement, wherever there is life, wherever anything is carried into effect in the actual world, there Dialectic is at work." He goes on to say, "We have a vision of Dialectic as the universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however secure and stable it may deem itself."²³ This means that forms in reality move in a dialectical process and are constantly subject to revised understandings. Hegel's claim that the "Dialectic is at work" with respect to anything in the actual world, instead of just forms of thought, may appear puzzling. This claim hinges on Hegel's idealism, which is a key feature of his philosophy. In short, Hegel views reality as Spirit, which is the "unity of the different independent self-consciousnesseses."²⁴ Objects of knowledge are seen as manifestations of Spirit, not in the sense that they are figments of our imagination but that "we arrive at knowledge of them through social practices, and by contrasting them with other kinds of objects and so by putting them in a social context."²⁵

Marx saw himself as utilizing a dialectical method.²⁶ The narrative describing capitalism in Das Kapital frequently comes to contradictions, which are incorporated and used in its development. One contradiction is that every commodity-owner wants their commodity to be a general equivalent that they can directly exchange with any other commodity, so that they can obtain a commodity with a use-value valuable to them. However, since every commodity-owner wants this, no commodity can be a general equivalent. This is resolved by money, which, Marx says with language echoing the Hegelian dialectic, "does not abolish these contradictions, but rather provides the form within which they have room to move."²⁷ Another important contradiction is between the tendency of capital to maximize surplus-value and the tendency of capital to reduce the number of workers employed, even though only labor-power generates surplus value. This contradiction is resolved by observing that by increasing technology-use and scale of production, capital can increase the productivity of labor-power, therefore needing fewer workers to obtain greater surplus value. Here, Marx's unification of opposing tendencies of capital aligns with Hegel's description of the final stage in his dialectical method: the "unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition."²⁸

Still, Marx's dialectical method has important differences from Hegel's. Marx studies forces that work in the material world and transform material things. These forces are socially constituted, but they are not mental, as in Hegel's philosophy. The capitalist system rests on particular social relations, but the humans within it need not be aware of these relations. Since Marx's dialectic is materialist, it is empirical: contradictions are resolved by, and unities contingent on, practices observed in the real world. Therefore, Marx's dialectic does not develop internally as Hegel's does, instead relying on things outside of the object being studied. Due to this contingency, Marx's dialectical method is less teleological than Hegel's.

History

The teleology of the Hegelian dialectic is most evident in Hegel's views on history. In Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he proclaims, "The History of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom."²⁹ In that work, which was adapted from lecture notes, Hegel traces the development of Spirit through different states over three thousand years. While his treatment of these historical civilizations was dubious and not well-supported, the novel project itself demonstrates several important things. First, Hegel viewed societies in history as guided by distinct principles. Second, Hegel saw knowledge as belonging to communities, instead of existing in individuals or by itself. Viewing communities as knowers informed Hegel's position that philosophy does not give us truths independent of our society but rather is inextricably rooted in its time. Therefore, parallel to states throughout history being in a dialectical movement towards freedom, competing philosophies contribute over time to the progressive unfolding of truth.³⁰

Marxism is profoundly historical. The first sentence of The Communist Manifesto (1848) reads, "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles."³¹ Like Hegel, Marx advanced a narrative about history. In the Paris Manuscripts (1844), Marx credits Hegel with the discovery that world history is the process of man's self-creation.³² Marx saw world history as determined by material conditions and modes of production of successive societies. He analyzed capitalism as a particular historical mode of production, different from those that came before it and what will come after it. Just as Hegel sees philosophy as existing within its point in history, Marx does the same with economics, rather than viewing economics as dealing with the same basic problem across history as classical economics does.

Marxism is often associated with historical determinism for proclaiming the inevitability of a proletariat revolution and the downfall of capitalism. While Marx does make such claims at points, such as in The Communist Manifesto, Michael Heinrich argues that these claims are hopeful words from Marx the revolutionary instead of analytical conclusions based in his scholarship. Heinrich believes that at its core, Marx's work is not deterministic, and that his analysis of capitalism and its fetishism cannot lead one to see any outcome as inevitable.³³ However, successors of Marx, such as Friedrich Engels and Karl Kautsky, were more deterministic. It is important to understand that many forms of Marxism are vastly different from Marx's views. Marx is perhaps the only thinker in history whose thought was explicitly adapted into the official ideology of several states. This ideology, Marxism-Leninism, is devoid of Marx's nuance. Two tenets of Marxism-Leninism are historical determinism and ontological materialism, which takes matter to be the fundamental substance of reality. Like historical determinism, Marx did not subscribe to ontological materialism. His work described the interaction between mental activity and material conditions and did not view that interaction as reducible to matter.³⁴

Spirit

The subject in Hegel's system is Spirit, which he defines as the "absolute substance unity of different independent self-consciousnesses, which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect freedom and independence: I that is we and we that is I."³⁵ Spirit is both the subject and object of knowledge, knower and known. History for Hegel is the development of Spirit, in which Spirit undergoes a self-realization process and comes to know itself as Spirit. Capital, in Marx's analysis of capitalism, is parallel to Spirit. It is the object of the process-that which is valorized. It is also the subject of the process-that whose aim becomes the aim of the process. Marx calls capital an "automatic subject".³⁶ Capitalism is its self-movement as it unceasingly self-valorizes.

Alienation

A core problem in Hegel and Marx's philosophies is alienation. Alienation refers to the problematic separation between a subject and an object that belong together.³⁷ The concept of alienation is seen in multiple places in Hegel's work, but it plays a critical role in the central narrative of the Phenomenology of Spirit (consciousness to self-consciousness to Spirit to Spirit that knows itself as Spirit). Here, alienation is "the mind's inability to recognize itself in an externalization which it nevertheless knows to be it".³⁸ For example, at one point consciousness views God as separate and distinct from itself. This alienation leads to unhappiness. This is resolved by consciousness coming to realize that it is, in fact, part of God.³⁹ In the Phenomenology, alienation and reconciliation are a productive part of consciousness' development.

In the Paris Manuscripts, Marx commends and criticizes Hegel's idea of alienation in the Phenomenology, making it clear that his own theory is a development from Hegel's. Marx's critique is that alienation for Hegel is strictly mental. He writes, "For Hegel the human being - man - equals self-consciousness. All estrangement of the human being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness."⁴⁰ Marx's theory of alienation asserts that capitalism is alienating. Marx sees laboring and producing objects, and in doing so actualizing our potential, as essential to human essence or "species-being". Capitalism is alienating because it separates the worker from the product of his labor and control of the production process. Therefore, it alienates the worker from his species-being.⁴¹ In Marx's view, overcoming alienation will take revolutionary change in the social systems of the real world. It is notable, however, that later in his life (such as when writing Das Kapital) Marx abandoned talk of alienation, preferring to critique capitalism through economic analysis.

Lordship and Bondage

One of the most influential parts of Hegel's philosophy is the lord-bondsman dialectic, found in the Phenomenology. This dialectic describes the relationship between two consciousnesses: the lord, who is independent, and the bondsman, who serves the lord. What is at stake here is epistemological; for a consciousness, to be independent is to view every other object as dependent on, constructed by, or explainable by itself. In the lord-bondsman dialectic, we learn that the bondsman is actually independent, and the lord dependent. The bondsman's independence is achieved through the labor he does at behest of the lord. Through his labor, the bondsman shapes reality. In the object of his labor, the bondsman's independence is demonstrated and preserved. Hegel writes that "the individuality or pure being for-self of [the bondsman's] consciousness..., in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence."⁴² This recognition of labor as essential to independent consciousness was deeply important for Marx. Of Hegel, Marx wrote, "he grasps labour as the essence of man."⁴³ Marx believed that the proletariat, while deluded by fetishism like the bourgeoisie, could by virtue of their economic situation come to see through this fetishism and abolish capitalism. Marx has been interpreted as giving the proletariat, which he called the "revolutionary class"⁴⁴ a privileged epistemological position.⁴⁵

Freedom

Hegel's conception of freedom brings Marx to mind. Freedom is the overarching aim of Hegel's political philosophy. However, Hegel understands freedom differently from its conventional understanding as the ability to choose what one wants.⁴⁶ Hegel defines freedom as "being by oneself in another"⁴⁷ or "to be at home with oneself in one's other"⁴⁸. Freedom is self-understanding or self-determination, which can only be achieved through reference to another.⁴⁹ True freedom for individuals is realized only within the state, in fulfilling the obligations of their roles as members of the state.⁵⁰ In Peter Singer's interpretation, Hegel finds freedom "in conformity to the social ethos of an organic community."⁵¹

Marx, too, finds freedom as the absence of external restrictions (negative freedom) insufficient. In fact, Marx describes freedom as a critical condition for capitalism's existence. For labor-power to be a commodity on the market, workers must be free-in control of their own labor-power and able to sell it. They must also be free of means of production, and thus left with selling labor-power as the only viable means of survival.⁵² This second "freedom" shows the hollowness of the first. Both Marx and Hegel aimed for self-determination in a way they viewed as going beyond negative freedom, not rejecting it. Nevertheless, dissatisfaction with negative freedom, which is the liberal conception of freedom, can help explain why both thinkers have been associated by some with authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

Conclusion

I believe that Hegel's most important influence on Marx was the dialectic. Marx used Hegel's dialectic, from a materialist rather than idealist perspective, as his method of investigation. In contrast to Suchting's claim that Marx's use of the dialectic was merely terminology, the dialectical method shaped Marx's analysis of capitalism, as shown in the examples of money and opposing tendencies of capital. Given Hegel's belief that history is a dialectical process, the connection here extends to views on history. Hegel's novel view on history influenced Marx. Even if, as Heinrich argued, Marx did not assert that certain outcomes were inevitable, he still saw history as a interpretable process determined by material conditions and modes of production.

The other deeply important connection is the identification of alienation as humanity's core problem. Alienation, the problematic separation of subject and object that belong together, is resolved by unification. Reflecting this, Hegel's system is extraordinarily unified. We are moments of Spirit, the "I that is we and we that is I." Similarly, even though Marx's core attack on capitalism is not that it is too individualistic (capitalism has its own particular social relations), his call for communism is in a sense a call for unity. Accordingly, despite different focuses and opposed views, the thrust of the two authors' work can be unified. Considering that Marx did not in fact subscribe to an ontological materialism, his critique of capitalism is not antithetical to Hegel's idealism. Stepping back from the particularities of their views, I believe that it is possible that as consciousnesses, we are alienated from objects of knowledge, which much be resolved through Spirit coming to know itself as Spirit and-at the same time-as participants in material social relations, we are alienated by capitalism, which must be resolved by replacing these social relations. Hegel's epistemological and metaphysical picture-though not his political and social one-can fit under Marx's revolutionary theory.

1. W. A. Suchting, "Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction'," Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15, no. 4 (1985): 427, https://doi.org/10.1177/004839318501500402.
2. Karl Marx, "Postface to the Second Edition" in Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, trans. Ben Fowkes (Penguin, 1976), 103.
3. George Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel (Seabury Press, 1974), 12.
4. Andreja Novakovic, Civil Society, Philosophy 181: Hegel (class lecture, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, November 18, 2025).
5. Marx, Capital, chap. 1, 125.
6. Michael Heinrich, An Introduction to the Three Volumes of Karl Marx's Capital, trans. Alexander Locascio (Monthly Review Press, 2012), 59-61.
7. Heinrich, Introduction, 49-51.
8. Heinrich, Introduction, 52-55.
9. Marx, Capital, chap. 1, 164-165.
10. Heinrich, Introduction, 70-79.
11. Heinrich, Introduction, 85-89.
12. Heinrich, Introduction, 91.
13. Heinrich, Introduction, 93-96.
14. Marx, Capital, chap. 25, 799.
15. Heinrich, Introduction, 181-185.
16. Suchting, "Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction'," 423-424.
17. Suchting, "Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction'," 427.
18. Suchting, "Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction'," 423.
19. Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel, 5.
20. Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel, 5-9.
21. Christoph Schuringa, Karl Marx and the Actualization of Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2025), 17.
22. G. W. F. Hegel, "Preface" in Elements of the Philosophy of Right, edited by Allen W. Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge University Press, 2025), 22.
23. G. W. F. Hegel, Hegel's Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. William Wallace (Oxford University Press, 1975), sec. 81, 116-118.
24. G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford University Press, 1977), sec. 177, 110.
25. Andreja Novakovic, Lecture Handout for Lordship and Bondage continued, Phenomenology concluded, Philosophy 181: Hegel (class lecture, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, October 14, 2025).
26. Suchting, "Marx, Hegel and 'Contradiction'," 409.
27. Marx, Capital, chap. 3, 198.
28. Hegel, Hegel's Logic, sec. 82, 119.
29. G. W. F. Hegel, "Introduction" in The Philosophy of History, trans J. Sibree (Marxist Internet Archive), https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history3.htm">https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/history3.htm.
30. Chris Christensen, The Trouble with Hegel, 129 (2018): https://philosophynow.org/issues/129/The_Trouble_with_Hegel">https://philosophynow.org/issues/129/The_Trouble_with_Hegel.
31. Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore (Project Gutenberg), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/31193/31193-h/31193-h.htm">https://www.gutenberg.org/files/31193/31193-h/31193-h.htm.
32. Karl Marx, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole" in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, trans. Martin Milligan (Marxist Internet Archive), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm">https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/hegel.htm.
33. Heinrich, Introduction, 196-198.
34. Lichtheim, From Marx to Hegel, 25-26.
35. Hegel, Phenomenology, sec. 177, 110.
36. Marx, Capital, chap. 4, 255.
37. David Leopold,, "Alienation" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition) (Stanford University), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/alienation/">https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/alienation/.
38. Louis Dupré, "Hegel's Concept of Alienation and Marx's Reinterpretation of It," Hegel-Studien 7 (1972): 218. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26595392.
39. Peter Singer, "Hegel & Marx," interview by Bryan Magee, The Great Philosophers, BBC, 1987, 14:23, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQeS6EH8bPw">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iQeS6EH8bPw.
40. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.
41. Dupré, "Hegel's Concept of Alienation," 230.
42. Hegel, Phenomenology, sec. 195, 118.
43. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts.
44. Marx and Engels, Manifesto.
45. For example, see the section titled "The Standpoint of the Proletariat" in Georg Lukács' History and Class Consciousness (1923).
46. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, sec. 15, 48-49.
47. Andreja Novakovic, "Human Beings as Ends-in-Themselves in Hegel's Philosophy of History," The Review of Metaphysics 73, no. 2 (290) (2019): 233. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26862732">https://www.jstor.org/stable/26862732.
48. G. W. F. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline, Part I: Science of Logic, trans. Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Cambridge University Press, 2010), sec. 24, 60.
49. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, sec. 7, 41-42.
50. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, sec. 257-258, 275.
51. Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001), 45.
52. Heinrich, Introduction, 91.